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Abstract 
Evidence-based medicine (EBM) has been effective because it confers both epistemic and moral 
authority, promising that both individual patient care and public health interventions are effective, 
safe and efficient, that these decisions and standards can be determined (and therefore judged) in a 
transparent manner and that this form of decision making is reliable, objective and value-free. The 
problem is that EBM refers to particular, ideologically and philosophically specific concepts of 
evidence, medicine and the relationship between them. The analysis of the ‘ethics’ of EBM, 
therefore, requires not only a critique of its philosophical naïvety and its attachment to modernism 
and positivism, but a critique of its social, cultural and political implications. 
 
 
Over the past decade and a half since the inception of evidence-based medicine (EBM), evidence-
based principles and practices have come to have a profound influence on the setting of biomedical 
research priorities, the generation of public health and clinical practice guidelines and the 
implementation of these guidelines in practice. At present, all funders and publishers of biomedical 
research and all policy makers and practitioners of clinical and public health medicine are expected 
to understand and implement the principles of EBM. 
Evidence-based medicine (which has variously been described as a paradigm, a methodology, a 
practice, a system of regulation or audit and a political movement) has been so effective because it 
has and confers both epistemic and moral authority. It promises that both individual patient care 
and public health interventions are effective, safe and efficient, that these decisions and standards 
can be determined (and therefore judged) in a transparent manner and that this form of decision 
making is reliable, objective and value-free. 
There is not and cannot be anything inherently wrong with medicine that incorporates or is based on 
evidence. On the contrary, that is what we should all be striving for all the time. The problem is that 
‘evidence-based medicine’ is different from ‘evidence’‘based’‘medicine’, in that the term refers to 
particular, ideologically and philosophically specific concepts of evidence, medicine and the 
relationship between them. The analysis of the ‘ethics’ of EBM, therefore, requires not only a 
critique of its philosophical naïvety and its attachment to modernism and positivism, but a critique 
of its social, cultural and political implications. 
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What is EBM? 
One of the difficulties of examining EBM in any substantive way is that it takes many forms and is 
emergent, like many concepts promulgated through different discourse communities [1]. 
Evidence-based medicine first emerged from the work of a group of professors of epidemiology, 
biostatistics and medical informatics at McMaster University in Canada [2]. The initial formulation of 
EBM was very clear: it was that medicine should be based upon the ‘conscientious, explicit and 
judicious use of current best evidence’[3] and that ‘best evidence’ should be identified using 
‘epidemiological and biostatistical ways of thinking.’[4] Through the methods it privileged, EBM 
distinguished itself from traditional medicine, which relied on unsystematic observations, medical 
intuition, pathological principles and clinical experience [3]. 
Evidence-based medicine has since been further qualified as ‘. . . the integration of best research 
evidence with clinical expertise and patient values’; [5, p. 1] and ‘the integration of best research 
evidence with our clinical expertise and our patient's unique values and circumstances’[6]. While 
what constitutes the ‘best research evidence’ is generally not defined in texts of EBM, the best 
evidence is specified, to some extent, by the ‘evidence hierarchy’, an a priori ranking of study 
designs that are generally based on ideological or consensus judgements about which studies are 
most likely to provide estimates of ‘truth’ through reliable and valid data. Over 60 such evidence 
hierarchies exist [7], although the vast majority place randomized controlled trials (RCTs) and meta-
analyses near the top [8]. Guyatt and Rennie [9], for example, lay out a ranking of methods that 
practitioners should use in order to evaluate published evidence for a new therapy (where evidence 
generated by higher ranked methods supplants data generated by lower ranked methods). 
    • N of one RCT; 
    • systematic review of randomized trials; 
    • single randomized trial; 
    • systematic review of observational studies addressing patient-important outcomes; 
    • single observational study addressing patient-important outcomes; 
    • physiological studies, and 
    • unsystematic clinical observations ([9, p. 7]). 
Criticisms of EBM 
Since its first conceptualization, EBM has gained and retained considerable power, becoming 
incorporated into medical curricula worldwide, colonizing other fields of practice, such as nursing, 
complementary medicine and public health, and spawning journals, research centres, web sites and 
the like [10,11]. There are a number of reasons why this may be the case. EBM provides epistemic 
power/authority and legitimacy; it provides a means of managing complex and extensive datasets; it 
provides a means of using data and controlling both uncertainty and disease; it promises access to 
knowledge about the best and least harmful therapy and it carries normative power – to practice 
any other form of medicine is to abrogate one's moral responsibility [12]. 
In recent years, however, a large body of clinical, philosophical, bioethical, sociological and 
anthropological literature has emerged challenging every aspect of EBM – its theoretical 
structure/foundations/assumptions, its method and its practice/translation into policy [13–18]. 
The criticisms of EBM are well known and may be summarized as follows: 
    • That it may displace clinical judgement and patient values and narratives from decision making, 
even where it does take account of these. 
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    • That EBM (or at least the authority it confers) may be used to justify restriction of expenditure 
and patient choice. 
    • That it is based on a self-sustaining circularity as it gives priority to those things for which there 
are good data – in a world where not everything is amenable to measurement, or at least 
measurement according to the types of epidemiological or biomedical methods preferred by 
EBM – the RCT, systematic review and meta-analysis. 
    • That is may create an imperative to conduct research (notably RCTs) where there already exists 
sufficient evidence to support the rejection or adoption of a therapy or practice. 
    • That it promises, but is unable to apply epidemiological data to the care of individuals. 
    • That it is systematically bias towards individualized interventions. 
    • That it has been unsuccessful in dissemination and implementing evidence into practice. 
    • That there is no evidence that EBM has produced better patient outcomes than ‘traditional 
medicine’[19]. 
    • That it may restrict patient choice and limit the options available to clinicians and patients 
(thereby limiting the autonomy of each). 
Advocates of EBM have often responded to these criticisms by pointing out that they arise from a 
misunderstanding of EBM, result from the enthusiastic but misguided application of ‘crude’ EBM or 
are irrelevant as they simply point to the limitations inherent in all research/practice [20–22]. These 
defences are both true – as many of these concerns relate to the definition, generation and use of 
evidence in medicine, by whatever means, and untrue – as they fail to accept that EBM is also an 
ideology and epistemology that valorizes particular forms of evidence and particular processes of 
reasoning. And certainly it is true that EBM may both threaten doctors' authority (general 
practitioners lost power while academic doctors and epidemiologists gained some power and status) 
and perpetuate it (over complementary and alternative medicine and other professions), may be 
used to provide resources, or at least to create an argument that a resource should be provided, and 
also create an argument for restriction of services and for therapeutic or policy nihilism, and may be 
used to make an argument that a service or intervention is both without evidence (and therefore 
without value) and evidence-based (and thus, value-able). In other words, EBM may be 
operationalized differently by different people, different stakeholders and within different health 
systems – something for which EBM may not be held entirely responsible for but equally something 
that is also facilitated by the promise and actuality of EBM [20]. 
What is most striking about the critiques of EBM, however, is the fact that many have not been 
rejected or contested, but accepted and incorporated. Hierarchies of evidence have been modified 
to take account of methodological critiques of RCTs and the entire notion of EBM has been modified 
to place EBM within the clinical context. Most notably, in the paper by Sackett et al. published in the 
British Medical Journal in 1996 [3], they described a Venn diagram with three interlocking circles 
termed research evidence, clinical expertise and patient preferences. This diagram was, of course, 
subsequently further modified to place evidence within interpretive art and clinical experience [23] 
Likewise, development of models of ‘evidence-based patient choice’, which combine EBM and 
patient-centred care, has emerged in response to criticisms of EBM that it excluded the patient and 
was concerned more with the clinicians and the passive transfer of information [24]. In other words, 
criticism has been assimilated through corrections to the original formulation of EBM. 
The evolution of EBM 
Since its inception, EBM has been the subject of considerable professional and political debate and 
its principles and practice have evolved over time. There is, for example, an increasing recognition of 
the importance of integrating clinical expertise and patient values into evidence-based practice, of 
the need to avoid ‘cookbook’ and ‘defensive’ EBM practice and of the need to challenge the 
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traditional hierarchy that privileges randomized trials over all other study designs. Whether these 
concerns have been addressed adequately is open to debate. 
Initial formulations of EBM, regardless of one's views of them, were clear. It is now, however, 
increasingly difficult to define what EBM is and is not (to paraphrase Sackett [3]). The initial ideas 
about hierarchies of evidence, about the promise of EBM and about its translation into practice have 
all become increasingly fragmented as EBM has tried to accommodate many of the challenges about 
the nature, biases and value of evidence. Brody, for example, in a defence of EBM, describes how 
‘sophisticated EBM’‘. . . accepts the best available evidence may be studies of different 
methodology, may be pathobiological data or may even be clinical experience and fully accepts 
uncertainty.’[20] Strauss et al. likewise, suggest that EBM no longer prioritizes the RCT or meta-
analysis, and accepts that at times the best available evidence may be ‘clinical anecdote’[25]. 
While this degree of intellectual dynamism is, on the one hand, to be admired, it creates substantial 
problems for the utility and (apparent) simplicity of EBM. It is also impossible not to be reminded of 
Popper's description of problems that may emerge from theoretical accommodation. As he notes in 
Conjectures and Refutations: 
    “Some genuinely testable theories, when found to be false, are still held by their admirers 
– for example by introducing ad hoc some auxiliary assumption, or by re-interpreting the 
theory ad hoc in such a way that it escapes refutation. Such a procedure is always possible, 
but it rescues the theory from refutation only at the price of destroying, or at least lowering, 
its scientific status.” [26, p. 37] 
But if EBM has lost some of its original (apparent) coherence, what it has retained is its rhetorical 
force and its moral status. Thus, while it may be increasingly hard to recognize or describe EBM, it 
remains even harder to speak against it. 
Ethics and EBM 
Evidence-based medicine, like health care itself, carries considerable moral force. For if health care is 
something that we value, and EBM promises the most effective means for identifying and 
implementing the safest, most effective and most efficient health care interventions, then we are 
morally obliged to practise EBM [12]. But even if we accept the goals of EBM, there is good reason to 
question the assumptions and practices of EBM and to ask whether unreflective application of EBM 
can actually create harm.1 
In general terms there are eight major ethical critiques of EBM. They are: that the research methods 
that form the basis of EBM are themselves ethically problematic and raise difficult issues related to 
placebo controls, randomization, stopping rules and therapeutic equipoise; that the implicit and 
explicit requirement for RCTs may lead to unnecessary research being done where sufficient 
evidence already exists; that methods privileged by EBM, most notably the RCT, are 
methodologically unable to answer questions related to individual patients; that EBM allows, or 
demands, consideration of data regardless of the ethics of its generation; that evidence hierarchies 
are inadequate and misleading; that the dataset that EBM draws from is systematically bias; that 
evidence is not value-neutral and cannot be easily translated into practice and that the translation of 
evidence into practice through clinical practice guidelines and decision aids is both ethically and 
epistemologically problematic. In this paper I will concern myself primarily with the adequacy of the 
EBM evidence base, the hierarchies of evidence and the translation of evidence into practice and 
then consider how EBM may respond to questions about the adequacy and application of evidence 
in medicine. 
                                                          
1
 In attempting to understand the ethics of EBM I must acknowledge the work of Kenneth Goodman [27], Miles 
Little [1], Mona Gupta [12], Michael Loughlin [28], Ross Upshur [29], Michael Lowe [30] and Maya Goldenberg 
[11]– among others. 
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Ethics and the (in)adequacy of the ‘evidence base’ of EBM 
Evidence-based medicine places great store in data derived from empirical studies and assumes that 
these data provide access to ‘truths about the world’. But even if one accepts that this positivist 
assumption is correct, there is good reason to doubt the integrity of these data and to question 
whether they adequately represents the experiences and interventions that they seeks to clarify 
[12]. Gupta [12], Goldenberg [11] and others have described the sorts of biases that determine the 
evidence upon which decisions in medicine turn. 
Technical (methodological) bias 
Any system is fundamentally consequentialist if it demands that everything is measurable and 
comparable. The problem for EBM, which claims to provide a process for reasoning and decision 
making based on data (or evidence), is that some outcomes of medicine are not adequately 
measurable or comparable (such as pain), some may not be measurable at all (such as justice or 
cultural integrity) and some (such as quality of life) may not even be adequately definable [30]. This 
requires either that these outcomes are somehow excluded from any calculation of efficacy or 
benefit, that some value (which may represent the meaning and ontological significance) is attached 
to that outcome or that outcome is placed outside the realm of evidence but within another domain 
relevant to decision making, such as patient preferences or context, which in turn still requires some 
means for balancing it against empirical evidence. The other consequence of this difficulty in 
defining and measuring all the relevant outcomes of health care is that it is more likely that we will 
conduct research into those things we can test and we are more likely to publish the results of 
studies we can easily understand and incorporate into our decision making. 
Consider, for example, how we investigate death and dying. Despite the fact that in many ways the 
concept of health is determined by the way that we understand death, we understand relatively 
little about the experiences of pain and suffering and even less about the experience of dying. In part 
this is because we have no ready-made language to describe the meaning of these experiences. In 
part it is because dying is the most extreme possibility that we can comprehend – the recognition of 
the certainty of our own extinction towering over every other statement of certainty in life and the 
biosciences [31]. And in part it is because what is special about dying is its singularity, its uniqueness, 
its ‘unsayability’ and aloneness – while we may empathize with someone who is dying we cannot 
really know what kind of suffering they are going through [32]. While some narrative or qualitative 
accounts of dying may give some insights into this suffering, the idea that we will obtain some 
measure of understanding or generalizability through measurement or quantitation and that we 
should prima facie prefer such measures, is nonsensical. Rather, those things that give us genuine 
insights into the meaning of suffering and dying (rather than instrumental concerns of dying, such as 
analgesic requirements or attitudes to cardiopulmonary resuscitation) are literature, music, poetry 
and philosophy. The music of Mozart, the poetry of Larkin and Auden, the language of Dostoyevsky 
(who described the sense that ‘a house is collapsing on you’), the philosophical insights of 
Kierkegaard (who described the anxious dread of death that lies within happiness) and Heidegger 
(who described the imminence of death and the loss of a future and past that occurs as one dies) – 
these are the things that allow us even a glimpse of the experience of dying [33–35]. And if we 
accept that these types of insights, these types of ‘non-medical forms of knowing’ do allow us to 
understand dying – where would we place them in our hierarchies of evidence, how would we make 
them commensurable with other ways of knowing? Even if we were to say that we have no way of 
incorporating them within out hierarchies of evidence but that they fall within some of the other 
sectors of our Venn diagram of medical decision making – perhaps in the sectors of context or 
clinical experience or patient preferences (although of course these also fit poorly in to these 
domains), how are we to describe exactly how these insights fit with the others and with empirical 
evidence? 
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Cultural and gender bias 
Evidence-based medicine not only draws from existing evidence, it demands its generation, 
publication and, following assessment of its quality, its application. In doing so it holds out the 
promise of transparency, objectivity and universalizability. But data reflect the context in which they 
were produced and the social, cultural and political context clearly influences the framing of what 
counts as evidence, the determination of the research agenda, the production of research evidence 
itself and the selective utilization of that evidence in policy and practice. Obesity is a major health 
issue in some contexts but not others, dialysis in the elderly can be justified in some contexts but not 
in others, and even something as ‘real’ and non-socially constructed as leukaemia is treated one way 
in the USA, another in France and yet another in Australia and the UK – all on evidentiary grounds. 
Evidence, therefore, is socio-culturally constructed. This seems uncontroversial. But evidence is also 
expensive and technologically grounded and the standards and processes of evidence and EBM are 
not accessible to all cultures and all people. This means not only that the data we have, the evidence 
we construct, is relative, but that it is systematically biased and discriminatory. It also means that it 
can change the very understanding of disease, diagnosis, treatment and prognosis and so create its 
own taxonomy of disease and illness. A disease in the West, for which there is evidence, becomes 
different to that same disease in the developing world. This creates the possibility for increasing 
harm to large numbers of people through the misapplication of evidence. 
Publication bias 
Evidence-based medicine relies on the existence and availability of data. One of the early challenges 
for advocates of EBM was to ensure that data adequately represented ‘reality’. The problem is that 
data may not be easily accessible, because they are hidden for commercial interests or are in the 
grey literature or may not represent experience, because of publication bias in the scientific and 
medical literature. Publication bias (whereby journals are more likely to publish positive and/or 
statistically significant results and also more likely to publish particular study types, e.g. RCTs, than 
others, such as qualitative studies) serve both to narrow the dataset available to guide decisions and 
to misrepresent the experience or intervention in question [36]. While clinical trial registries, grey 
literature databases and guidelines for conduct of systematic reviews have, to some extent, 
ameliorated these biases, it is unlikely that they can ever account for the epistemic bias in medicine 
and the paradigms of peer review. 
Commercial biases 
It is now widely recognized that commercial interests have distorted and restricted the data that we 
draw from – the ‘evidence base’ of EBM [37]. Indeed it is my view that the major risk of industry 
engagement with medicine is not its influence on prescribing but the impact on the epistemology of 
medicine and on the construction of disease, for example, the emergence of the bio-bio model of 
psychiatric disease. We know, for example, that: 
    • 60–80% of all clinical research in USA and 20–60% of clinical research in Australia is sponsored 
by the pharmaceutical industry. 
    • The conduct and governance of clinical research is increasingly moving out of hospitals and 
academic centres and to Contract Research Organisations who may have close ties to 
industry. 
    • >80% of professional organizations and journals are sponsored by, or receive advertising 
revenue from, the pharmaceutical industry. 
    • An increasing amount of clinical research is conducted in BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) 
and that, in general, the methodological and ethical standards of this research are less than 
research conducted in the West. And at the same time, the relative contribution of Europe, 
the USA, Canada and Australia to research is decreasing. 
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There are a number of implications of this for medicine, and for EBM in particular. There is evidence 
of a distortion of the research agenda (90/10 divide), distortion of evidence, with positive results 
more likely to be reported and pharma-sponsored studies more likely to generate findings 
favourable to the sponsored product [38–41], distortion of research methodologies (from superiority 
to inferiority studies), distortion of research questions (limited head-to-head studies) and delay or 
non-publication of key findings for commercial reasons (e.g. Cox-2 inhibitors and SSRIs in children). 
The adverse impact of these distortions is significant, including the loss of researcher integrity and 
independence, creation of multiple ties and conflict of interest, loss of transparency in science and, 
perhaps most importantly, the erosion and distortion of the evidence according to which patients 
are treated and health policy developed. 
The impact of commercial interests on the very institutions that create and monitor quality in 
research cannot be overstated. At the current time, 65–75% of all clinical trials published in major 
medical journals – Annals of Internal Medicine, JAMA, NEJM and the Lancet – are industry-
sponsored [42]. This clearly benefits both parties. Journals want RCTs because they and their readers 
have come to regard them as the highest form of evidence and because they need both advertising 
revenue and revenue derived from selling supplements and reprints (sales of reprints of large RCTs 
brings in approximately $US1 million and has an enormous profit margin). Industry, in turn, relies on 
journals to publish RCTs and meta-analyses as they provide epistemic authority, media coverage, 
distribution and the sort of medical status that no form of advertising can provide. This has led those 
involved in medical publishing to question the manner in which they have been co-opted by 
industry. To quote just a few figures who are or have been prominently engaged in medical 
publishing in the last decade: 
    • Journals have devolved into laundering operations for the pharmaceutical industry (Richard 
Horton – Lancet) [43]. 
    • The pharmaceutical industry has co-opted every institution that might stand in its way (Marcia 
Angell – NEJM) [44]. 
    • Medical journals are an extension of the marketing arm of pharmaceutical companies (Richard 
Smith – BMJ) [42]. 
    • There is a cycle of dependency between journals and the pharmaceutical industry (PLoS Editors) 
[45]. 
None of these people are ‘industry ascetics’ and all express the same concern – the mechanisms that 
provide epistemic authority in medicine, research, publishing and peer review, are each diminished 
or altered by industry such that their adequacy and validity is called into question. These issues are, 
of course, a concern for all those engaged in health and biomedicine. But they do present particular 
changes to systems of thought, like EBM, that emphasize published research, empirical data and that 
ascribe particular authority to study types (RCTs and meta-analyses) that are largely ‘supplied’ by 
pharma [46,47]. The impact of this bias is difficult to quantify and is likely to have far higher impact 
in some areas of medicine than in others. The impact of this evidentiary distortion is also 
incremental and so less likely to be seen. As Brody has, rather dramatically, noted ‘. . . it will 
probably take years before we can determine the extent to which the evidentiary water supply has 
systematically become polluted in the last few decades as a result of commercial bias.’[20] 
Evidence, context, subjectivity and decision making 
Evidence-based medicine requires not only the generation and assessment of evidence but its 
integration with patient values and preferences and its translation into clinical practice. While this 
seems straightforward, it is, of course, anything but. In large measure this is because EBM is naïve 
about evidence (and research) [28] and because it fails to take adequate account of subjectivity – 
both in the identification and weighting of evidence and in the contribution of evidence to decision 
making. 
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Evidence-based medicine generally assumes that (research) data are the same as evidence, whereas 
in fact evidence is a status conferred upon a piece of data [27,28] and what counts as evidence is 
highly subjective [12,48]. A clinician may be interested in the recanalization of coronary arties with 
thrombolysis, whereas I will be interested only in the number of medications I need to take and the 
adverse effects of each of these medications. The US Food and Drug Administration may be 
concerned that an anti-arrhythmic agent increases the risk of sudden death, whereas I will be 
interested only in the fact that it improves my (limited) quality of life. In other words, what counts as 
meaningful evidence is contested, contextual, embodied and ultimately, negotiated. 
While EBM has long recognized that clinical decision making does not rely on evidence alone, and 
has facilitated the development of decision aids to assist individualized treatment decisions and 
facilitate the incorporation of patient's unique values and preferences into the decision-making 
process [6], it inadequately theorizes how one may weigh evidence against values, particularly when 
the two conflict, and implicitly gives greater weight to evidence. This may be enormously misleading 
as even the ‘best evidence’ may be of no value. Parents making decisions about the use of an 
adrenalin syringe for a child with possible peanut anaphylaxis may decide not on the basis of 
extensive epidemiological and immunological data regarding risk but on the basis of ‘future regret’, 
while patients considering whether to go ahead with a bone marrow transplant may choose not on 
the basis of a careful consideration of the risks and benefits of transplant in their situation, but on 
the basis that as they confront death there is, in reality, no choice. 
At a policy level, also, the priority given to evidence and the assumption that it is value-free and not 
determined by the theoretical frame of the inquisitor, may lead to blindness of the fact that 
decisions are based not simply on evidence but on a wide range of inputs and that the criteria for 
evaluating the efficacy of public health interventions may differ from clinical practice. This is 
particularly evident in transfusion medicine, where policy decisions are often based on 
considerations other than the best research evidence, including public expectations about 
transfusion/blood safety and proposals for applying the precautionary principle to transfusion 
medicine [49]. EBM may also compel action on the basis of existing evidence, even where that 
evidence is incomplete or inadequate, because it is ‘the best available evidence’, and this may 
ultimately problematize complex social issues simplistically. In Australia this has been a feature of 
recent policy making in Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Health Care, where evidence of disease 
(such as ear disease in children) or social problems (notably child sexual abuse) has provoked 
massive but profoundly inadequate policy responses. For evidence, even if it is acknowledged to be 
only part of the picture, creates a moral imperative to act and provides epistemic authority in ways 
that ethical principles often do not. 
While these challenges, of identifying what counts as evidence, attaching weight to it and integrating 
these assessments of evidence with patients or groups values or preferences, are an issue for all of 
medicine, by privileging evidence, and empirical evidence in particular, I would suggest that they are 
more of a threat to EBM. 
Evidence . . . of what? The problem of evidence hierarchies 
Evidence-based medicine arose, in part, as a response to the practical need to manage the massive 
amounts of data relevant to medical care. It provided a simple approach to complex medical 
problem, a way to mediate between competing data, interests or claims and a promise of 
objectivity, impartiality, consistency, rationality, truth and certainty. The reality, of course, is that 
EBM could provide none of these things as evidence is not value-free, self-apparent, disinterested or 
atheoretical [50] but is socially and culturally constructed, relational, gendered, embodied, 
intersubjective and communal [51–53]. 
The mistake that EBM makes, as Maya Goldenberg and others have pointed out, is that it relies upon 
a largely discredited positivist view of science and evidence [11,16,28,54,55]. The assumptions that 
EBM makes about the authority and objectivity of scientific evidence, assumptions that have been 
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the subject of extensive philosophical and feminist critiques, are ethically problematic for four 
reasons. First, they serve to obscure the socio-political and moral determinants of health care 
decisions at the clinical and policy levels. Second, they do not account for the fact that what counts 
as evidence may be determined by those in power and with authority, most notable those in 
medicine and in government [56,57]. Third, by valorizing the objectivity of evidence and certain 
methods for establishing evidence, EBM and evidence-based policy making accentuate the biases of 
biomedicine and the gaps in the evidence base of medicine [11]. Thus, the evidentiary exclusion of 
women, vulnerable groups and those in the developing world are not rebutted by EBM but 
incorporated into guidelines and promulgated through practice [51]. And fourth, they guide and 
reinforce the type of evidence that ‘counts’. 
It is difficult to be critical of the methodologies of EBM as there are so many descriptions of EBM and 
it has, as I have described, increasingly attempted to incorporate different forms of evidence. But I 
think it remains true that for the most part EBM has had remained true to quantitative measure of 
evidence, the meta-analysis and the RCT, and had some difficulty including evidence that is 
narrative, phenomenological and qualitative. This has meant that EBM has largely turned away from 
questions and experiences that are difficult to define or measure or categorize, such as quality of life 
concerns, issues related to death and dying and questions of sexuality and mothering. It has also 
meant that EBM has been slow to recognize that hierarchies of evidence have been based largely 
upon ideology, that different research methods have different strengths, that measures of quality 
are more important within categories of method than between and that the evidentiary hierarchy is 
largely dependent upon the question being asked than any a priori judgement of evidentiary power 
[11]. 
Flexibility or unrecognized incommensurability? Beyond hierarchies of evidence 
The central claim of EBM is that medicine should be based upon the ‘conscientious, explicit and 
judicious use of current best evidence.’ While this seems a reasonable aim, EBM, as both a method 
and a social movement [58] has had difficulty achieving this because its' (original) epistemic basis 
was rigid and did not take account of different forms of ‘evidence’, because the philosophical and 
methodological assumptions upon which EBM is based are highly questionable, because it (EBM) did 
not provide an adequate model of decision making and because it could not account for the 
difficulty in applying research data to individuals [16,19,59–62]. 
Advocates and critics of EBM have responded to concerns regarding the privileging of RCTs and 
meta-analyses within EBM by proposing that EBM should recognize that the academic traditions and 
methods of the humanities, social sciences and applied sciences provide very different notions of 
what counts as ‘evidence’ and that less quantitative or less ‘tangible’ forms of evidence, such as that 
offered by qualitative research and narrative, should be incorporated into EBM [29,63–65]. Similar 
concerns have also led to calls for EBM to incorporate pathophysiological data, clinical expertise, and 
the values and goals of patients (often after quantitation into ‘patient utilities’ amenable to analysis 
and inclusion into decision tools) [66]. This represents a radical departure for EBM as its original 
formulation made it very clear that research data were different from, and more important than, 
other ways of knowing, such as clinical experience, patient narratives and pathophysiological data. 
While it would seem highly desirable to integrate different kinds of knowledge into EBM, the 
recognition of qualitative or non-empirical kinds of knowledge presents a major challenge for EBM. 
First, it is not at all clear how one can meaningfully integrate different types of knowledge, 
knowledge that is epistemologically, ontologically and methodologically distinct, into EBM under a 
broader umbrella of evidence or how one can decide where these different types of knowledge fit in 
any evidence hierarchy [62]. Hierarchies of evidence, which claim simply to provide a ranking of 
quality and/or validity, are based upon philosophical assumptions about the status and meaning of 
knowledge and it may be that ways of knowing are so distinct that they are both incommensurable 
and irreducible and cannot be incorporated within a single ‘theory’ of decision making. Second, even 
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if one were able to incorporate different ways of knowing into EBM, EBM remains largely silent 
about how a practitioner could balance all the (possibly) conflicting types of knowledge and then 
understand these in light of the patient's values and goals [29,62]. And in the face of such 
uncertainty, EBM and practitioners of EBM, will retain an implicit or explicit preference for empirical 
research data [48]. While the continued preference for certain types of evidence, particularly RCTs, 
may infuriate critics of EBM, it is probably important for EBM that it prefers the results of empirical 
research data as to do anything else simply erodes its integrity, utility and authority (just as Popper 
would have predicted). 
There are, however, alternatives to persisting with this model of EBM. One alternative is to base 
medical decision making not around evidence, but around values. ‘Values-based medicine’ has been 
posited as an alternative to EBM on the grounds that health care is primarily a moral enterprise 
based upon universal values, such as caring and compassion and that these values are pervasive and 
are the major determinants of decisions about health, clinical practice and research [67]. A second is 
to train doctors in what Berkwitz has called ‘a social model of criticism’ that would encourage them 
to recognize the social and cultural forces that shape research activity, the selection of evidence and 
the development of policy [68]. 
A third alternative is to clearly separate the different ways of knowing such that EBM is used only as 
a tool to evaluate outcome derived from quantitative research, and kept distinct from other types of 
knowing and from other influences on decision making, such as narrative, qualitative data, 
sociological and anthropological research data, pathophysiological data and patients' goals and 
values. Mark Tonelli has made a case for this type of process, arguing that a casuistic approach 
(which bases consideration of ‘evidence’ around the particularities of a clinical case) more closely 
mimics the ‘real world’ of clinical care, allows for the integration of different forms of evidence and 
still enables assessment of the quality of evidence, within each category of evidence. In a landmark 
paper [62] he outlined the five topics relevant to medical decision making: 
    • empirical evidence – derived from clinical research; 
    • experiential evidence – derived from clinical experience and from expert knowledge (of others); 
    • pathophysiological rationale – based on underlying theories of physiology, disease and healing; 
    • patient values and preferences – derived from interaction with individual patients, and 
    • system features – including resource availability, societal and professional values, legal and 
cultural concerns. 
Tonelli argues that none of these topics take priority over the other and any may prove 
determinative in a particular clinical decision. While EBM gives priority to empirical evidence, 
Tonelli's approach genuinely does require ‘conscientious and judicious’ use of empirical evidence. 
For Tonelli the task for clinicians is to weigh up the various warrants for action by employing both 
practical and theoretical reasoning skills (phronesis) and by comparing their patient with paradigm 
cases from the literature. This approach is appealing because it acknowledges complexity and 
because it requires close attention to context and to a patient's situation and judgement by the 
clinician as to whether the ‘average patient’ from empirical research resembles the actual patient 
sitting in front of them (although arguably so do late constructions of EBM, as these also place 
empirical evidence in the context of values and clinical expertise). The other benefits of this 
approach are that it demands acknowledgement of the difficulties in negotiating between 
evidentiary and non-evidentiary forms of knowledge, does not see practice variation as a weakness 
and demands rigour and transparency in decision making. While Tonelli's model is attractive, it 
remains relatively under-theorized and it is unclear how this approach would work at the level of 
policy making. 
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Conclusion 
Evidence-based medicine promised certainty, simplicity and better decision making and arguably has 
delivered none of those things. But I would suggest that this is both because of the philosophical and 
methodological inadequacies of EBM and because of the very nature of medicine. Medicine is 
complex, messy, difficult and constantly requires normative judgment. And the space that medicine 
inhabits, furthermore, is richly contextual and filled with different sorts of data that may not be 
comparable in any meaningful sense and may be valued differently by different people. As such, it 
may be that in seeking to modify or improve EBM, or to come up with an alternative meta-theory of 
medicine or even to provide a monolithic model of clinical decision making, that we are seeking a 
false certainty and asking too much of EBM and of evidence. 
This is not to say that clinical research, including the results of RCTs, is irrelevant to health care – 
indeed such a claim would be impossible to sustain. Nor is it to say that EBM is completely unhelpful, 
or even that the EBM movement has been counterproductive, for it has certainly encouraged a 
critique of medical authority, has facilitated development of quality criteria in research and tools for 
managing massive datasets and brought out into the open debates about evidence and justification 
in medicine. And the hierarchies of EBM may still have (more restricted) utility in the analysis of 
epidemiological data. 
Rather than propose an alternative model for decision making, I would suggest that what is (still) 
required is further reflection on the definition and function of evidence in medicine and the goals of 
medicine (both in general and for each individual patient). At both the clinical and macro levels we 
need to continuously ask ourselves: 
    • What is evidence being used for? 
    • What counts as evidence and what evidence counts? 
    • What is the evidence we have, or seek, evidence of? 
    • What weight are we giving to each type of evidence? 
    • How are we to incorporate these different types/pieces of evidence into our decisions? 
These questions are important for any system of medical decision making as they determine both 
the nature of our discourse with others (who may answer them differently because they may have a 
different epistemology of evidence or risk) and the way that we will identify ‘best evidence’, as this 
may depend largely upon the question asked and the theory used. If, for example, I seek information 
about causation, then I may well rank the results of an RCT above other types of studies. If, on the 
other hand, I seek insights into the experience of dying I may turn to qualitative research, narrative 
accounts or poetry and if I am interested in population determinants of risk or outcome, then I will 
likely attend more to the results of molecular epidemiological studies of biobanked tissue 
specimens. 
But while clinicians and their patients should be able to identify, discuss and critically appraise the 
medical and non-medical ‘evidence’ in light of their specific situation, evidence cannot provide the 
certainty and security that each require, particularly for patients, who seek not only expertise but 
also care and respect at a time of great vulnerability. Clinical decision making draws upon a range of 
different ways of facts, reasons and ‘knowledges’ and it is the manner in which these are considered 
and balanced in the light of a particular patient's needs, perspectives, values and beliefs that gives 
health care its essential character. Thus, what may be required is a recognition that assessments of 
evidence must be made in the context of uncertainty and a commitment to presence, discourse and 
to ongoing critical appraisal of the evidence as it emerges during the illness trajectory. Clinicians may 
therefore assess the available evidence in terms of internally valid measures of quality, consider this 
evidence in light of the patient's specific situation, and, in discussion with the patient, weigh this up 
against the patient's goals and preferences and alongside other forms of evidence. This process of 
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judgement will inform clinical management and shape the dyadic relationship. It may turn out for 
the best, and it may not. And where it does not the clinician will need to sceptically re-examine the 
judgements made. 
While this formulation will discourage those who wish to have a simple guide for decision making in 
medicine, I would argue that it simply acknowledges what practitioners and policy makers already 
know, that medicine is discursive and political and unavoidably normative and while we expect 
evidence to play a role in decision making, what we ultimately require is judgement. 
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